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Chapter 10

The ‘New’ Heidegger
Babette Babich

10.1

Calculating Heidegger: From the Old to the New

The ‘new’ Heidegger corresponds less to what would or could be the Heidegger of
the moment on some imagined ‘cutting edge’ than it corresponds to what some wish
they had in Heidegger and above all in philosophical discussions of Heidegger’s
thought. We have moved, we suppose, beyond grappling with the Heidegger of
Being and Time. And we also tend to suppose a fairly regular recurrence of
scandal—the current instantiation inflamed by the recent publication of Heidegger’s
private, philosophical, Tagebücher, invokes what the editor of these recently
published ‘black notebooks’ attempts to distinguish as Heidegger’s ‘historial
antisemitism’ — ‘historial’ here serving to identify Heidegger’s references to World
Jewry in one of the volumes.1 We have hardly come to terms with the question of
Heidegger and Nazism. To say this does not mean that some scholars do not read
Heidegger as if one might bracket such historical associations or that others,
conversely, think only of his all-too official Nazi affiliation as university rector in
1933–1934 and refuse, categorically, to read him at all. Indeed, the force of the
most recent scandal threatens a new scholarly imperative towards just such
non-engagement in the wake of what the popular press calls, following Trawny,

1

The ‘Black Notebooks,’ as these are called, correspond to the three (at the date of this writing)
most recent editions of Gesamtausgabe, IV Abteilung, Hinweise und Aufzeichnungen, Vols. 94–96
(See GA 94, GA 95, GA 96), edited by Peter Trawny. A fourth volume, (GA 97), until now in the
hands of Silvio Vietta, is scheduled to be published in March 2015. As editor, Trawny has also
issued a commentary highlighting the third of the notebooks (GA 96). See Peter Trawny, Heidegger
und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann,
2014).
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Heidegger’s Nazi ‘contamination,’ a term that itself echoes Habermas’s language
with respect to Nietzsche.2
At the same time, Tom Sheehan, who has already earned his anti-Heidegger
stripes in earlier scandals on this same theme, is today insisting that all Heidegger
studies convert to what Sheehan names a ‘new paradigm,’ reducing being to meaning, a call that Sheehan already published as such more than a decade ago.3 Don
Ihde—who years ago also stopped engaging Heidegger in his own work in technology studies—has similarly issued a call for a post-phenomenological move, which
would bracket Heidegger even more than Husserl.4 So what is stopping Sheehan’s
‘new paradigm’ or Ihde’s post-phenomenology? Perhaps only the trivial or ontic
detail that we continue to lack what might count as a genuinely ‘new’ Heidegger,
assuming indeed that what we mean by the rubric of the ‘new’ is not merely a desire
to shift a paradigm from the concerns of others to the concerns of a single scholar
(no matter whether Sheehan or Ihde). Any talk of the ‘new’ should hold at least to
the standard set in continental philosophical convention not with respect to
Heidegger but Nietzsche, the thinker Heidegger claimed the most decisive for his
thinking, in David B. Allison’s collection, The New Nietzsche.5 What made Allison’s
Nietzsche ‘new’ was nothing other than the same Heidegger who influenced every
other author in Allison’s collection: Derrida, Deleuze, Klossowski, Blanchot,
Lingis, etc. To date, there is no comparable programme of reflections on Heidegger.6
This particular point is one that can be made without adverting to the important
differences between readings that one once upon a time might have counted as
‘analytic’—here taking the term, pars pro toto—to stand for today’s ‘mainstream’
readings, those of Dreyfus and Blattner and Guignon, Kelly and Haugeland and
Okrent and Brandom, to name some American readings, along with Lafont and
Philipse among many others, along with more traditional, or so-called ‘continental,’
readings such as those of Dastur and Janicaud and Schürmann but also like
Kockelmans and Kisiel and certainly the present author.7
2

See Joshua Rothman, ‘Is Heidegger Contaminated by Nazism,’ The New Yorker, April 28 2014.
Rothman’s essay describes the audience and the atmosphere at the April 8, 2014 interview with
Peter Trawny, the editor of the notebooks, with Roger Berkowitz and later featuring a panel discussion adding Babette Babich, sponsored by the Goethe-Institut in New York.
3
Thomas J. Sheehan, ‘A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger’s Research,’ Continental Philosophy Review
34(2001): 183–202.
4
Don Ihde, Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1973).
5
David B. Allison, ed. The New Nietzsche (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985).
6
For further on this, see the several contributions in Keith Ansell-Pearson, ed. The Fate of the New
Nietzsche (Aldershot: Avebury, 1993). See also the broad range of contributions in the journal
explicitly founded in 1996 to foreground the new spirit of Allison’s New Nietzsche Studies.
7
The tradition of analytic scholarship also includes its own distinctions and differences and, detailing this further, one can add the contributions to Christopher Macann, ed. Martin Heidegger:
Critical Assessments (4 Volumes) (London: Routledge, 1992), in addition to the tool-philosophers
who reduce Heidegger to what is called object-oriented philosophy among other new bids to avoid
engaging other readings of Heidegger.
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In the interim, virtually everything written on Heidegger seems, more or less dissonantly, to advocate a restart. Thus, we are urged to start again, to return to the
early Heidegger, the later Heidegger, to reflect after Heidegger and thus, post
Heidegger, to think beyond him. Such recommencements include the habit of genealogizing Heidegger as well as efforts dedicated to re-thematizations of his work
from the standpoint of political scandal.8
Perhaps, a better question would be to ask why we continue to refer to Heidegger
at all? Given Heidegger’s ‘contaminated’ thought or given that Heidegger might
have been talking not about being but meaning, surely we are better off with a return
to Frege or Wittgenstein, if not Searle or Austin or even Cavell? If Heidegger is
outdated or has misled us as, for example, certain readings of his work on ontology
are unified in suggesting, why not simply take up with another thinker, say, Lefebvre or
Simondon or Laruelle or Latour or Sloterdijk or, just to go all rock star on the
matter, Žižek himself? Indeed, why not do something else altogether? Of course,
this tactic too is old hat: re-baptised under the rubric of Heidegger’s contamination
with historial anti-Semitism and resuscitated under the new non-engagement
mentioned at the start. Omit Heidegger and move on. Has Heidegger not already
been too well represented to require either analysis or discussion? ‘Been there, done
that,’ says popular culture, and today’s new scholar ‘speculates’ accordingly.
Indeed, our all-too modern desire for the new together with our tired postmodernity, that is, our sense of the already post-datedness of almost everything, may be
the most persistent remnant of metaphysics, counted in millennia, as we date
everything from a particular last god (‘Nearly 2000 years and not a single new
God,’ as Nietzsche complained in all seriousness in his The Antichrist).9 In this
spirit, we seek our redemption from Heidegger by way of a ‘new Heidegger,’
post-Heidegger.10
There is a fated impossibility to any ‘new’ undertaking of this kind—quite apart
from the arbitrary assumption that is built into our chronological convictions that
we ourselves count as newer, better, more advanced. Certainly, we have not tired of
8

This politicizing goes, as one says in a certain American parlance, way back and has never been
altogether neutral, thus we may note Tom Sheehan’s review of the Gesammtausgabe itself in his
well-titled, Thomas J. Sheehan, ‘Caveat Lector: The New Heidegger,’ New York Review of Books
(December 4, 1980). See for example, Miguel de Beistegui, The New Heidegger (London:
Continuum Press, 2005).; Theodore Kisiel and John Van Buren, eds., Reading Heidegger From the
Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).;
Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1993). The scandals themselves also go way back, indeed, to just after the war, arguably also
during the war and, as noted in the text, seemingly resurface from time to time, such as the very
plainly titled, Emmanuel Faye, Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy, trans.
Michael B. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
9
Friedrich Nietzsche, Der Antichrist, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Kritische
Studienausgabe, Band 6 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), § 19, 185.
10
The term dates from the very conflicted notion of the postmodern for Ihde and for other scholars
who use the term in this sense. See, to begin with, Don Ihde, Heidegger’s Technologies:
Postphenomenological Perspectives (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010).
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the ‘siren twitterings’ of those Nietzsche named the ‘old metaphysical bird catchers,
who have all too long been piping’ at us: ‘“you are more! you are higher! you have
a different genesis!”’11
And we are quite sure that the ‘metaphysical bird catchers’ are right about us: all
of us are secret Harry Potters, scions of lost wizards, with secret powers. In the same
way, many of us are quite happy to designate ourselves posthuman (this would be
Donna Haraway’s cyborg) or transhuman (whether alluding thereby to Nick
Bostrom or Ray Kurzweil), while, and at the same time, others exercise themselves
in bootless worries about the fate of being post-anything: from the now well and
truly dated postmodern condition to post-analytic philosophy, and, of course, we
eagerly add post-continental philosophy to boot. Beyond the merely posthuman,
if we today opt to call ourselves transhuman, for which achievement we need
do nothing at all, all performative work done by the trans-, and the achievement
sheerly one of designation or ‘branding.’ Thus, ignoring the implications of the
anthropo-obscenity of our self-absorption and our destructiveness, we declare
ourselves Humanity 2.012 and the parallel with consumer product updates and
capitalist speculation does not seem to be a coincidence.
Add update and stir, et voila!—and as if life were a television screenplay—
we have Humanity: The New Generation. Thus, we debate the ethical implications
of deploying technologies barely extant and become a new old vision of ourselves,
packaged and marketed for a profit margin that does not, as it turns out, include
most of us, no matter our efforts to buy every latest gadget, as illustrated by the (now
failed) worldwide movement known as Occupy Wall Street. There is no one who
doesn’t want to buy the latest thing, live the advertised good life. But the jobs are
lacking, the houses too costly to buy, the rents obscenely high, and all this calls
more than ever for a reflection on building, dwelling, thinking. The point of profit is
also political. And we should ask about the politics of it all, but we do not: there is
no god but capital—another meaning of speculation. And the Heideggerian programme of asking questions is itself complicated these days inasmuch as political
control is increasingly a matter of media i.e., what is disseminated and what is not.
What we do not see does not exist. Social protest movements are not given media
time any more than their more or less brutal police suppression, unless there is a
political reason to make it public. Nor is this limited to the social. We talk about
climate change while ignoring weather modification technologies, fracking, mining, farming, fishing. And, above all, we ignore the spills and disasters consequent
upon our activities. Nor do we think about what we do not see. All the oil seeping
from the seabed, so we are confident, has vanished, been ‘cleaned up’ in the Gulf of

11

Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft, ed.
Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 5 (Berlin: de Gruyter,
1980), § 230.
12
In the interval between the time I first wrote this, Steve Fuller has obligingly published an invaluable overview of the traditional working notion of the human throughout the sciences, especially
the human, social and political sciences. See Steve Fuller, Humanity 2.0: What it Means to be
Human Past, Present and Future (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
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Mexico after the BP seabed rupture and undersea volcano. All gone. (Hardly, to be
sure, but that would be the theme of another essay.)
Heidegger writes, almost in Theodor Adorno’s Frankfurt School voice, almost in
Günther Anders’ voice, of the relation between thinking and media, reflecting that
‘we do not yet hear, we whose hearing and seeing are perishing through radio and
film under the rule of technology’ (KE, p. 46).
The collusion between capital and supposed ‘democratic’ representation is unremarked upon, although everything that happens on the political world stage reflects
this collusion. And today, a theoretical and even more importantly, a technical, datarife, book appears on the stage, Thomas Piketty’s Capital as if to tell us, bristling
with statistics for the scientistically minded among us—and we are all, as Tzvetan
Todorov underscores the point, more rather than less scientistic—that this collusion
and the disparity between classes, rich and poor, enfranchised and not, has not
changed over time and cannot change.
If we take this point to another limit, that would be the Twitter or Facebook or,
more patently still, the LinkedIn extreme of self-marketing, we thereby set aside the
whole array of questions needed to consider such a self-assessment as the residuum
of a by-now superseded, outmoded, ‘humanist’ worldview.13 But the ontic details
remain, and, like the faded Arab spring, the Wall Street occupy movement is over—
protesters systematically brought to order by prosecution and imprisonment,
adjudged in the interim as legal felons, under which title they will now live their
lives.
And who wants to talk about Heidegger and capitalism anyway? Certainly, and
after Nietzsche, and given Adorno’s failures, one would think one would know
better.
Out with the old, in with the new. Let’s just talk about ‘objects’ and pretend to be
‘things.’ As the Heidegger of Being and Time says, this modern passion for the new
is the ‘curiosity’ that seeks newness ‘but only in order to leap from it anew to another
novelty’ (SZ, p. 172). The insight persists throughout his work if it has gotten him
little more than a reputation for being a rustic or black forest thug: critical of what
he calls ‘idle talk.’ Everywhere and nowhere, ‘curiosity is concern with the constant
possibility of distraction,’ but not in the sense of ‘observing entities and marvelling
at them,’ as Heidegger remarks, and as distinguished from philosophical wonder, ‘to
be amazed to the point of not understanding is something in which it has no interest’
(SZ, p. 172). As Heidegger goes on to add, both ‘idle talk and curiosity take care in
their ambiguity to ensure that what is genuinely and newly created is out of date as
soon as it emerges before the public’ (SZ, p. 174).
13

See, for example, of an overview of such concerns, Julian Savulescu and Nicklas Bostrom, eds.,
Human Enhancement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)., which takes the notion of the
‘post-human’ condition about as literally as one might wish. For one overview of transhumanism
as a concept, see Nicholas Agar, ‘Whereto Transhumanism? The Literature Reaches a Critical
Mass,’ Hastings Center Report 37, no. 3 (2007): 12–17. There are any number of essays and books
on the theme of the post- and transhuman, as what Heidegger called the rush to overreach ourselves
as the rage to think about and to write and to publish on nothing but the latest topics shows no sign
of abating.
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But as we thus attend only to what we anticipate as the latest thing, we are also
well able to suppose that that fascist, eugenicist worldview was what was (Nazism),
and that what we are promised in our new humanity 2.0 is somehow different.
Indeed, more than the fantasy of the embedded gills that would permit one to swim
underwater or the wings that might permit us to soar through the air, or any of the
other things that might have been supposed, the new humanity 2.0 when it is not
about prosthetic limbs turns out to be little more than having the virtual equivalent
of prosthetic limbs, namely internet access, wireless access. Jean-François Lyotard
would have been delighted, as he praised efficiency, above ‘the true, the just, or the
beautiful … a technical move is good when it does better and/or expends less energy
than another.’14 Be it with Google or a Twitter or Facebook account, and above all
with a certain dedication to life ‘online,’ our transhumanity is always mediated, a
matter of attention; focus on a conversation, a game, a film, and automatically transcend our here and now.
Does the newly transhuman condition really reflect the ‘latest thing’? Perhaps
but then everything old is new again. Well in advance of Steve Fuller or JeanFrançois Lyotard or Marshall McLuhan, Heidegger’s student, the phenomenological media theorist of radio and television, music and sound, Günther Anders had
challenged us to reflect in Heidegger’s spirit on the mediating of media. For Anders,
in a phenomenological reflection on radio and television and film, contending that
‘no medium is only a medium,’15 what matters is our devotion to having the ‘event’
come to us rather than the other way around.16 Rather than being oneself involved,
messily, bodily, in real time, real world events, we voluntarily, using our own free or
“leisure time,” as Anders emphasizes this in 1956, enslave ourselves to fabricating
the very mass media selves—we used once to call them logins, avatars, screen
names, and such; but the mindmeld is complete, and we no longer do that—and
today we live and flourish in the image of networked media, from radio to television
to the so-called cloud. Thus, our trans-humanity is negotiated digitally, we ‘act,’ like
other ‘actants’ via network connections, no matter whether the network is meant
literally, digitally or metaphorically, speculatively, in terms of capital investment.
And the literal net (be it of networked things or selves) does not work on us without
its own just as literally or all-too embodied connection to us. Today, we remain
‘connected’ via a changing proliferation of gadgets to which (this is key) we pay no
attention (this is how mediation works in the case of media). Intentional beings as
we are, intent on what we now simply, as if we ourselves were programmers, call
‘content,’ we relate to the computers on our desks while attending to neither our

14

Jean-François Lyotard, Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington
and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 44. I discuss this in
Babette Babich, ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra, or Nietzsche and Hermeneutics in Gadamer, Lyotard,
and Vattimo,’ in Consequences of Hermeneutics: 50 Years After Gadamer’s Truth and Method, ed.
Jeff Malpas and Santiago Zabala (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010), 218–243.
15
Günther Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, Band 1: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der
zweiten industriellen Revolution (München: Beck, 1987), 99.
16
He writes: ‘Die Ereignisse kommen zu uns, nicht wir zu ihnen.’ See ibid., 110.
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computers nor our desks, unless, and as Heidegger reminds us, something goes
wrong; and when I say this, of course, I include tablets of whatever networked kind,
like iPads, but I am also including as omnipresent cell phones, smart televisions,
traffic and street cameras for surveillance, in the pocket networking, all ready to
hand. These constitute and thus effect the current commercium to use Heidegger’s
1927 terminology. Both Heidegger and Anders emphasize that mediation, that is to
say, the means by means of which our communication is mediated, always makes a
difference even as it withdraws from our awareness inasmuch as or because our
attention is—and this is the way intentionality always works—elsewhere. To this
extent, we are our multitouch gestures, we are our keyboards, real or virtual, we are
our screens or displays—because what we touch and what we see mediates our
interaction—tablets/iPads, smart phones, taking ‘smart’ television or cable or cell
service for granted as we do, along with the entirety of what we call media in all its
monotony, the lot of it mediated via an internet connection, mostly wireless, and to
hell with the bees (and we are sure that cell phones can’t possibly harm bees or any
living thing) and to hell with our health.17

10.2

Technology and Transhumanism

Impatient to be done with Heidegger’s warnings regarding what he named ‘calculating representation’ (KE, p. 45), both in Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis),
especially now that it is clear that the same terminology also appears in connection
with Heidegger’s Black Notebooks, but also and to be sure in Heidegger’s reflections on science and his questionings concerning technology, we remain quite certain, contra Heidegger, that we will indeed be able to calculate as we must and
thereby ‘save’ our technological cake and eat it too.

17

Ved Parkash Sharma and Neelima R. Kumar, ‘Changes in Honeybee Behaviour and Biology
under the Influence of Cellphone Radiations,’ Current Science 98, no. 10 (25 May, 2010): 1376–
1378. To this day, research on the damage done by cell phones to bees continues to be disputed;
likewise, the effects of cell phone use on human health are also disputed. Nevertheless, it has long
been known that cell phones present in measurable fact a danger to human health, but this fact, and
this is so even when acknowledged and it should be said that the industry continues to ‘dispute’ it,
has had little practical influence on regulation and even less on cell phone use. But see the World
Health organization’s ‘Electromagnetic Fields and Public Health: Mobile Phones, Fact sheet
N°193,’ (Geneva: World Health Organization, June 2011). I discuss the limitations of scientific
publishing in the circular context of mutual censoring characteristic of peer review, esp. pp. 360–
361, in Babette Babich, ‘Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and
Bugbears, Whigs and Waterbears,’ International Journal of the Philosophy of Science 24, no. 4
(2010): 343–391. For a discussion of the bees themselves, see one study that records the bees’
screams (which the scientist ‘objectively’ describes and so diminishes as ‘piping’), see Daniel
Favre, ‘Mobile Phone-Induced Honeybee Worker Piping,’ Apidologie 42, no. 3 (2011): 270–279.,
as well as the study by the medical epidemiologist, Devra Davis, Disconnect: The Truth About Cell
Phone Radiation, What the Industry has Done to Hide It, and How to Protect Your Family (New
York: Dutton Adult, 2010).
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Long past our post-war technological anxieties, we embrace the salvific promise
of technology: the more, the better. And far less turns out to be needed for salvation
than anyone ever seemed to have imagined in the 1930s dreams of technological
Molochs. In fact, as Horlkheimer tells us, as Baudrillard tells us, all we need is the
iconic, the imaginary: the image suffices. The idea of genetic engineering, the
notion of software engineering, the concept of digital technology repackaging, like
reality TV make-overs are seemingly all we need to ensure our confidence in a corporate vision or advertisement of what we take to be ‘the promise’ of the future.
Thus, we expect the technological singularity as a rapture to be had for everyone.
And if we listen to Ray Kurzweil and his marketing planners, pitched for new
investment opportunities, all of it is already coming, any day now, at more and more
affordable prices … .18
Apart from the all-too modern obsession with the ‘future,’ as Heidegger himself,
writing as he wrote in the space and time of two post-war Germanys, taking over
this engagement with time (and mortality) from the Stoics, our age is the very everyday concern with gossip.19 Thus, in his What is Called Thinking?, Heidegger writes:
Today every newspaper, every illustrated magazine, and every radio program offers all
things in the identical way to uniform views … The one-sided view … has puffed itself up
into an all-sidedness which in turn is masked so as to look harmless and natural. But this
all-sided view which deals in all and everything with equal uniformity and mindlessness …
reduces everything to a univocity of concepts and specifications the precision of which not
only corresponds to, but has the same essential origin as, the precision of technological
process. (GA 8, p. 36)

And what makes these uniform views more captivating than ever is that our interest is purely disembodied. We are, closed in our world, not seen seeing, or so we
imagine. This, too, Günther Anders emphasizes. For what is crucial for industry is
precisely that consumption not be public but standardized, just as Adorno says, just
as Marcuse says, universal or ubiquitous but above all atomized, autistic absorption,
perfectly private. The programming, the ‘conditioning’ (Anders uses both terms and
here he uses the English term in scare quotes in his German text) of the individual
takes place individually, in one’s home, separately and, this is the key for Anders,
quite individualistically, for everyone.20 All of the aforementioned kinds of ‘mediation,’ in Anders’ sense of the term, were and remain ways of connecting, without
having ourselves to be present: no connection, no actual contact, no fuss, no muss.
It is also true that we thereby mean to catch what ‘comes to us’ privately—thus our
18

See Ray Kurzweil and Terry Grosmman, Transcend: Nine Steps to Living Well Forever (Emmaus,
PA: Rodale Press, 2009).; Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend
Biology (New York: Viking, 2005).
19
See my first chapter on ‘branding’ and Facebook in Babette Babich, The Hallelujah Effect:
Philosophical Reflections on Music, Performance Practice and Technology (Surrey: Ashgate,
2013).
20
Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, Band 1: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution: 105. It is significant that Don Ihde himself would oppose the proposed English
translation of Anders’ 1956 book when it was recommended in the decades to follow as ‘too
negative.’
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unquenchable appetite for the ‘news,’ be it for reports of war, riots, scandal, sports
scores, all to anticipate what we suppose is coming, largely because of the conviction we have concerning the future, construed as we construe it as the only thing that
matters.
Like those clamouring emigrants at port, in Nietzsche’s quasi-psychoanalytic
aphorism in The Gay Science, entitled ‘The Thought of Death,’ an uncannily
Heideggerian or Lacanian sort of aphorism, we too comprise, as Nietzsche articulates it, nothing less than ‘a brotherhood of death,’ hell-bent on the future and
inspired in this by our ‘conviction’ (this term, which can also be translated as ‘prejudice’, is an importantly Nietzschean hermeneutic terminus) ‘that what has been
were little or nothing while the near future is everything.’21 Indeed, as Nietzsche
reminds us in black, satirical humour, ‘everyone wants to be the first in this future.’22
Hermes, who carries messages between divinities and mortals, also accompanies
the souls of the dead to their passage to the underworld, with Charon, the ferryman
of Hades, emblematic as Charon is for the (Christian) Michelangelo and for the
Stoics as he was always in evidence in archaic philosophical traditions, particularly
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius in addition to Nietzsche’s nearly contradictory
example of Epicurus.23 Nietzsche’s ‘The Thought of Death’ is accordingly thematically aligned to Heidegger’s own reflections in his Being and Time on that which
comes, Zu-kunft: the future is an unknown sea.24
It would be the Stoics who remind us that although meditation on future calamities may serve one well, time as such, regarded from the perspective that rules
everything that comes to be, that is to say, aeon beyond Chronos, is also the fond
image of time, as Eugen Fink also takes up this image in his analysis of the playing
of Nietzsche’s world child as this play conveys the cosmic legacy of Heraclitus and
Empedocles, now broken into three parts.25 Thus, too Nietzsche’s gate, Augenblick,
adds a third moment to the two collision courses of time, each into, each against
itself.
Here we note what all philosophers know: time may be separated out into various
moments only one of which approaches the momentary, that is the present (which
does not stay), the past (which cannot be altered), and the future (which cannot be
21

Friedrich Nietzsche, Die fröliche Wissenschaft, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari,
Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 3 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), § 278, 523.
22
Ibid. My emphasis, to be sure.
23
On Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius as well as Epicurus, see the several studies by Pierre Hadot,
particularly Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to
Foucault, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995). On Nietzsche and Epicurus,
see Howard Caygill, ‘The Consolation of Philosophy: Neither Dionysos nor the Crucified,’ The
Journal of Nietzsche Studies 7(1994): 131–151., as well as Fritz Bornmann, ‘Nietzsches Epikur,’
Nietzsche-Studien 13(1984): 177–188.
24
Cf. the beginning of the fifth book, added 5 years later in 1887, where Nietzsche speaks of a ‘new
cheerfulness’ and a sea open, like never before. See Nietzsche, Die fröliche Wissenschaft: § 342.
25
See Eugen Fink, Nietzsches Philosophie (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960), 187. The ancients, as
we recall Caesar’s word on the division of Gaul, were fond of tripartite scissions, old gods too, as
Nietzsche counts Christianity as a superannuated tradition.
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known with certainty).26 Clamour for the future, as we may, the strange point for
Nietzsche (as the concluding section of his Human, All-too-Human, entitled The
Wanderer and his Shadow, had already made clear enough) is the uncanny as such:
‘the shadow stands now behind everyone, as his dark fellow traveller’, thus ‘death
and deathly silence alone are certain and common to all in this future.’27
It is exactly this death, and we hardly need to say this when it comes to Heidegger,
that we do not anticipate. This is the ‘one death’ singularized as the German convention singularizes the death that one has to die, as it is the culmination of the existence that Dasein has to live, as one’s own death: einen Tod muss man sterben, that
is, as we say, sardonically, ironically, resignedly: you’ve got to die somehow. The
jokes that go along with various odd ways that people die speak to us, as Freud tells
about the relationship between what jokes tells us about our own truths, an all-toointimate or personal death that every one of us must, that is to say, that every one of
us has to die, and it is exactly this that we do not think in the mode of telling ourselves that of course, of course, it is so.
One dies. Thinking of the future, we remain disinclined to prepare for death,
let alone to contemplate death. Like those emigrants at Nietzsche’s Italian portside
and then as now, ‘nothing’ could be ‘further from their minds [our minds] than’ the
‘thought of death.’28
More important perhaps than these neatly proto-existential parallels is a particular
boredom. I began by noting our scholarly impatience for a ‘new Heidegger’ to say
new things to us just to the extent that it can seem that we need new things to read,
especially as it transpires, distracted as we are in a way that the Heidegger who
wrote on idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity could never have imagined distraction, that
we read less and less, even as we live our lives more mediatedly than ever through
the text, texting, email, online posts. Without reading what has already been written
on Heidegger, hard to do as many commentators point out, because so very much
has already been written on his work, we are impatient for the ‘new.’
26

Marcus Aurelius famously writes at the conclusion of his Meditations: ‘The things are three of
which thou art composed, a little body, a little breath (life), intelligence.’ And we may read his
account of his spirit or intelligence in Heideggerian terms: ‘Of these the first two are thine, so far
as it is thy duty to take care of them; but the third alone is properly thine. Therefore if thou shalt
separate from thyself, that is, from thy understanding, whatever others do or say, and whatever thou
hast done or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble thee because they may happen, and
whatever in the body which envelops thee or in the breath (life), which is by nature associated with
the body, is attached to thee independent of thy will, and whatever the external circumfluent vortex
whirls round, so that the intellectual power exempt from the things of fate can live pure and free by
itself, doing what is just and accepting what happens and saying the truth: if thou wilt separate, I
say, from this ruling faculty the things which are attached to it by the impressions of sense, and the
things of time to come and of time that is past, and wilt make thyself like Empedocles’ sphere, “All
round, and in its joyous rest reposing;” and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life,
that is, the present—then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of life which remains for thee up to
the time of thy death, free from perturbations, nobly, and obedient to thy own daemon (to the god
that is within thee).’ Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, trans.
George Long (London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1914), 12.3.
27
Nietzsche, Die fröliche Wissenschaft: § 278, 523.
28
Ibid.
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And seemingly predicting the psycho-cognitive effects of Googling and emailing
and downloading (this is the real Levinasian efficacy of Facebook), and above all
the effects of the interactive effects of social networks on our memories and our
capacity for innovative thought, Heidegger might well appear to have assessed the
results of the same before any of it came to pass to the degree that we today simply
take for granted:
The scholar disappears. He is succeeded by the ‘research man’ who is engaged in research
projects. These, rather than the cultivating of erudition, lend his work its atmosphere of
incisiveness. The research man no longer needs a library at home. Moreover, he is constantly on the move [ständig unterwegs]. (ZW, p. 85)

Heidegger thus writes ‘The Age of Worldview [Die Zeit des Weltbildes]’ for
scholars across the nationalistic board, as relevant to research in Nazi Germany as
indeed in the UK, as in America and Russia, not only in 1938 but today as well.
Here, Heidegger highlights what is inherent in the nature of the mathematical projection of the world, that is qua knowable, whereby Heidegger writes that ‘all
events,’ (and this has been hugely significant for Jean Baudrillard’s analysis of the
event), ‘if they are to enter at all into representation as events of nature, must be
defined beforehand as spatio-temporal magnitudes of motion, accomplished through
measuring, with the help of number and calculation’ (ZW, p. 79). And we know this,
we fans of correctness, as Heidegger explains exactly unremarkably, the point of
precision is effected through advance stipulation, as what is ‘already known,’ and
with this ‘already known’ Heidegger only repeats the heart of Nietzsche’s own epistemological, scientific insight: thus, we moderns, we scientifically-minded people
explore the unknown in every case by reducing it in every case to what is already
known. And we succeed in this, as Heidegger reminds us: ‘The rigor of mathematical physical science is exactitude,’ which works owing to stipulation. ‘The plan or
projection of that which must henceforth, for the knowing of nature that is sought
after, be nature: the self-contained system of motion of units of mass related spatiotemporally’ (ZW, p. 79). Here, the point for Heidegger is all about what stipulation,
as this is the foundation of scientific exactitude, is secured to begin with. Natural
science, he reminds us, ‘is not exact because it calculates with precision; rather it
must calculate in this way because its adherence to its object sphere has the character of exactitude’ (ZW, p. 79). In other words, what matters is method: natural or
mathematical science to be science ‘becomes research through the projected plan
and through the securing of that plan in the rigor of procedure’ (ZW, p. 79).
Heidegger would always emphasize that we have yet to begin to think, and he does
this again and again, with particular injury (as if he needed to be particularly injurious) to the sciences along that way, reflecting that we are ‘still’ not thinking in What
is Called Thinking? (1951/1952)—indeed, as he emphasized particularly with
respect to Nietzsche, as he also maintained that we have yet to begin to understand
even those ‘easy’ thinkers who serve us as our formative guides, this is Plato, as
Whitehead famously tells us (and this is especially true if we speak English), but for
German authors, this will also include Aristotle, Augustine, and this is also Kant and
even if we are not French (but especially if we are), this is Descartes as well. To the
list we can add Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger himself, etc.
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The problem is our conviction not only that we need a new Heidegger but a new
everybody and everything else in philosophy. We suppose ourselves to know all this
past philosophy. Thus, analytic philosophy, following the model or exemplar of the
philosophy of science, which early on separated itself and its prospects from what it
called the history of science,29 names the entirety of the concern with Heidegger as
well as Nietzsche or Kant or Plato and so on, as so much history of philosophy. Here
this mainstream or ‘analytic’ terminus is only deployed to differentiate such ‘historical’ studies from what is to be counted as philosophy proper. For such properly
mainstream philosophy, all we need is what analytic scholars tell us is to be acquired
via the sciences (philosophy says what science says or it is not philosophy) or else
via survey on the model of the social sciences (i.e., what is called ‘experimental’
philosophy, on the model of Brian Leiter’s web polls). Both reference points raise
the ticklish question of the academic redundancy of mainstream or ‘analytic’ philosophy on its own terms but these same terms dictate the importance of the contemporary or the ‘new.’
And yet reading Heidegger, Nietzsche, Kant, Plato, etc., should correct the conviction that we already know what they are saying. Once we begin to read an author
we think we know, even when we do know this author, perhaps especially when we
do know the author, we find ourselves in the realm of the unexplored: finding
nuances, sometimes whole ranges of riches missed the first time, contexts we failed
to see and points we realize may be vanishing from our grasp even as we notice
them now for the very first time. We know a text, we know an author, only in our
vain conviction that we know.
In this sense, we have yet to begin to read Heidegger. We do not ‘know’ Heidegger,
any more than we ‘know’ Nietzsche, any more than Heidegger knew Nietzsche, a
realization that was anything but an empty one in the human, all-too-human progression of Heidegger’s own life. All wisdom consists in this.
I mean to emphasize this in more than an esoteric sense, in terms of some secret
Heidegger specific to the 1930s or even the 1950s. I am not talking about Heidegger’s
unpublished works, be it the Contributions (GA 65) or his Mindfullness (GA 66) or
even the still undigested (untranslated, incomplete) Black Notebooks (GA 94, GA
95, GA 96, etc.). My point is much rather that we literally do not understand
Heidegger’s most well-known texts. Nor is this deficit a corrigible one. (I am not
saying that I have the secret reading, or that one should prefer my new paradigm to
any others on offer.) As Nietzsche points out, knowing the limitations of knowledge,
knowing that we are in error, is not to abrogate those same limitations, that same
error.30 This is the hermeneutic phenomenological point Heidegger seeks to make in
his teaching of Hölderlin and of Nietzsche, as of Aristotle and Plato, as Gadamer
remarks upon this, a teaching that Gadamer took up for his own part, and that the
later Heidegger argues as the need for thinking, for retrieve, reprise.
29

See Babich, ‘Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and Bugbears,
Whigs and Waterbears,’ 356f.
30
Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1880–1882, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino
Montinari, Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 9 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), 504.
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Hence, if one posed the question of the ‘new’ whomever, two long centuries ago
in 1810 or 1815, for example, say, in an academic reflection on Kant, it is likely that
one would not exactly have pointed to or even identified the profile of neoKantianism as we have known it historically. And we know this just to think of
Schopenhauer, as of Kierkegaard, as of Goethe, and so on. In the early years of the
nineteenth century, one’s sense of one’s own very philosophical future would have
been based, as are all of our futures, on one’s own past, precisely as one’s past only
comes to one, ‘temporalizes’ as we say, out of the future as we see it coming. To be
sure, the scholars in question can be defined as proto neo-Kantians, but that is precisely because our own classifications tend to work that way.31 But then, there would
still be what becomes Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Bergson, James and
Pierce, just to name a few philosophical names.32

10.3

Thinking the End of Philosophy and the Death
of the Scholar

Heidegger scholarship has long been fraught by interpretations bent on articulating
and defending/attacking one, usually limited, version of Heidegger’s work and
scope but also by those who take seriously Heidegger’s own reflections on interpretive rigor to apply these reflections to Heidegger’s thought.
Heidegger himself, and despite his well-known lack of (explicit) engagement
with contemporaneous scholarly literature, was nearly always engaged reflectively
with his own claims, par for the course for a thinker schooled in the critical style of
neo-Kantianism, together with theological hermeneutics, as in the kind of medieval
logic and method that would serve him in reading both Kant and Descartes, but also
31

Thus, we can think of a text that appeared in 1810 and happened to have been inspired by a call
from Berlin from Johann Christoph Hoffbauer (1766–1827), someone duly named a Kantian but
who could also be aligned as a Fichtean and who also stood in the broader Wolfian, Lambertian,
and Baumgartian traditions. See Johann Christoph Hoffbauer, Ueber die Analyse in Philosophie,
ein grossten Teils analytischer Versuch, veranlasst durch die erste, diesen Gegenstand betreffende,
Preisfrage der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin philosophischen Wissenschaften
(Halle: Hemmerde und Schwerke, 1810). The essay was dedicated to the philologist Friedrich
August Wolf whose 1795 Prolegomena ad Homerum pretty well inaugurated what remains known
as the Homer question, if scholars today tend to assume this question a fully answered or closed
issue and which was itself, precisely as a question, the theme for Nietzsche’s own inaugural lecture
at Basel, in addition to the physicist Georg Simon Klügel.
32
And, so too, if we skip ahead to 1910, a famous year all around, even there, it is still the case that
predicting the future of 20th century philosophy would have been a tough call, and the disputes
among various claimants to be the heirs to an unsettled throne continues today. For an account of
the philosophy of science and related issues, including the invention of moving sidewalks (1893),
not to be sure solely in 1910 but from 1890, and a bit prior to that and 1930 and a bit after that, see
Babette Babich, ‘Early Continental Philosophy of Science,’ in The New Century: Bergsonism,
Phenomenology and Responses to Modern Science, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson and Alan Schrift, The
History of Continental Philosophy (Chesham: Acumen Press, 2010), 263–286.
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with history as a discipline and including the study of art (perhaps most significantly
as Heidegger himself opts to mention it as part of his formation).33
When we look to our own future, claiming the twenty-first century as our legacy,
we are either, as Nietzsche would say, pregnant with the future or simply full of
ourselves: nur Narr, nur Dichter. What is certain, so history teaches us, is that mainstream scholars in any generation are sure that their pet projects constitute the future
while marginalized scholars have no such confidence, and not least for this reason
Nietzsche would have taught Heidegger to attend to the ‘few and the rare’ (although
the terminus is also part of the second century AD Lucian’s Philosophies for Sale
and so widely disseminated in translations by Erasmus and St. Thomas More and
echoed by Jonathan Swift who variously teach us about mainstream wisdom and its
attendant and oblique follies), just by contrast with the ‘few and the rare.’
By thinking of ourselves as so many variants on Nietzsche’s idea of the posthumous, qua philosophers of the future, one lays claim to the mainstream by other
means. This way of thinking goes together with our all-too-Hegelian and non-hermeneutic supposition that we are the first properly or rightly to read a thinker other
generations misunderstood or overlooked in their own time. This confidence, conviction, or prejudice is widespread in the history of philosophy. Certainly, Husserl,
in the middle of his career working with the Hilbert school in Göttingen, was persuaded of this virtuosity in 1910, as was, on the analytic side, Bertrand Russell who
had at the time just published the Principia Mathematica with Alfred North
Whitehead, a year innocent of Wittgenstein (who had likewise in 1910 patented an
aerodynamic propeller), an innocence even more marked for Kurt Gödel who was
all of 4 years old in the same year. Mathematicians reach their peak in their twenties,
and, two decades later, Gödel would prove formal incompletability in answer to
Hilbert’s call for mathematical foundations in 1900.
To our earlier citation of Heidegger’s reflection on time, ‘Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future’ (SZ, p. 331), what is noteworthy here is
that the past thereby becomes what we count as ‘having been’ (SZ, p. 338). Here, all
of Heidegger’s ecstatic reflections on time catch us up. Thus he writes, ‘The character of “having been” arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which
“has been” releases from itself the present’ (SZ, p. 326). Now we all know that this
crystallization of the past, in its character as ‘having been,’ thus in the whatness of
what has been, together with its relatedness to the future and the present is the very
temporal precondition of the possibility of authenticity as such: ‘Authentically
futural, Dasein is authentically having been’ (SZ, p. 326).
This point has been captivating for Tom Sheehan and his focus on Das Gewesen,
even if Sheehan also borrows (without, alas, mentioning it) a bit of Magda King’s
thunder in his fascination. Sheehan outlines the distinction and the philosophical
advantage for a reflection on time and being in simply having the linguistic wherewithal that permits one to say: Ich bin gewesen, ‘I am been,’ as opposed to what
33

Note that if Heidegger did not learn critical thinking from Rickert or indeed from Jaspers, he
certainly learnt it from Nietzsche. See discussion and references in Babich, ‘Towards a Critical
Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs and Waterbears.’
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King calls the round-about and confusing English transliteration, using hyphens to
make the temporal point : ‘I am-(as)-having-been.’34 But this means that Dasein qua
futural, with all its anticipatory dimensionality, that is, ahead of itself as it is, also
always finds itself attuned ‘as the being that it still is and already was, that it constantly is as having been’ (SZ, p. 328). It is indeed for this reason, as Heidegger from
the start of Being and Time develops this point, that one can become what one is, as
Pindar says to the benefit of Nietzsche’s amor fati. ‘We call authentic having-been
“retrieve”’ (SZ, p. 339).
In What is Called Thinking?, Heidegger observes that the project of thinking
about what is most thought-worthy eludes academic interventions, writing papers,
writing books, teaching, giving lectures at scholarly conferences. Instead, Heidegger
calls for action more in the spirit of a Marx than a Dilthey or a James:
The state of the world is becoming constantly more thought-provoking. True, this course of
events seems to demand rather that the human being should act without delay, instead of
giving speeches at conferences and international conventions and never getting beyond proposing ideas on what ought to be, and how it ought to be done. (GA 8, p. 6)

Heidegger observes in ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,’ a text
that is often more reacted to than read (egad! how can one say that philosophy is at
an end? Does one not see that the professors are still in possession of their chairs
and the students yet in eager pursuit of degrees to ignore those professors and lay
claim to chairs of their own?), the kind of thinking he intends as ‘preparatory thinking’ differs from the anticipation of projects for techno-scientific reflection. By contrast, for Heidegger,
The preparatory thinking in question does not wish and is not able to predict the future.
It only attempts to say something to the present which was already said a long time ago
precisely at the beginning of philosophy and from that beginning, but has not been explicitly thought. (GA 14, p. 75)

Here Heidegger invokes Parmenides, the ‘father’ of logic, the first thinker of
being, observing that Parmenides’ ‘thoughtful poem … as far as we know, was the
first to reflect explicitly upon the being of beings, which still today, although
unheard, speaks in the sciences into which philosophy dissolves’ (GA 14, p. 83).
This is the ‘end’ of philosophy, this is what comes ‘after’ metaphysics, here regarded
‘in the pure sphere of the circle in which beginning and end are everywhere the
same’ (GA 14, p. 83). Heidegger argues that the ‘contemplative human being is to
experience the untrembling heart of unconcealment,’35 which Heidegger goes on to
call the ‘place of stillness which gathers in itself what grants unconcealment to
begin with … the opening of what is open’ (GA 14, p. 83). Thus, Heidegger suggests that we must ‘think Ἀλήθεια, unconcealment, as the opening which first grants
34

Magda King, A Guide to Heidegger’s Being and Time (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2001), 219.
35
I discuss this translation of ἀτρεµὲς as ‘untrembling’ (rather than the more conventional
‘unshaken’) in an essay dedicated to Joan Stambaugh and her translations, in Babette Babich,
‘Truth Untrembling Heart,’ in Being Shaken: Ontology and the Event, ed. Michael Marder and
Santiago Zabala (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 154–176.
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being and thinking and their presencing to and for each other’ (GA 14, p. 83). The
argument thus continues that we also need to consider that ‘self-concealing, concealment, Λήθη, belongs to Ἀ-λήθεια, not just as an addition, not as shadow to light,
but rather as the heart of Ἀλήθεια’ (GA 14, p. 88).
The thinker who could think the needed paradox that here calls for thinking is set
upon already by the changing character of the intellectual world. There may be that
which calls for thinking, but the problem is that we who should heed this call are
increasingly unable to do so. It is not merely the case that we are ‘still not thinking’
as if we might somehow snap out of it: a scholar’s apprentice waking up from the
dream of reason. As we have seen, in an age of science as machination and businessintegrated enterprise, what matters is ‘impact’, economic and intellectual productivity and in such a celebration of ‘progress’, ‘the scholar disappears’ (ZW, p. 85).
Rather than ‘erudition,’ the research scholar strives in Heidegger’s estimation at the
time of his writing—a condition that as we noted above has not changed at all in the
interim—to attain and maintain at the so-called cutting edge: ‘The research worker
necessarily presses forward of himself into the sphere characteristic of the technologist in the most essential sense’ (ZW, p. 85).
Heidegger continues here in ‘Die Zeit des Weltbildes’ to write that ‘knowing, as
research, calls whatever is to account with regard to the way in which and the extent
to which it lets itself be put at the disposal of representation’ (ZW, p. 86). Far from
empty theory or thought, science, now transformed into ‘research’ (ZW, p. 86),
serves the common, productive, industrial or corporate good. Thus, as Heidegger
goes on to observe in ‘Wissenschaft und Besinnung,’ however much it appears that
physics has moved away from the determinism of the Newtonian world view,
wherein ‘every state of motion of bodies that occupy space is at any time simultaneously determinable—i.e., is precisely calculable in advance, predictable—both as to
position and as to velocity’ (GA 7, pp. 53–4), it nonetheless holds that in modern
atomic physics—and here Heidegger is speaking of complementarity—‘a state of
motion may on principle be determined either as to position or as to velocity’ (GA
7, pp. 53–4). The ‘or’ is logical or exclusive in this context. And yet, as Heidegger
quotes Heisenberg, the point of quantum mechanics always remains calculation:
‘being able to write one single fundamental equation from which the properties of
all elementary particles, and therewith the behaviour of all matter whatever, follow.’36
Here too, one has to do both with the objectification and calculation of nature as
well as precisely because one has to do with nature as such, the same nature that as
Heraclitus tells us, ‘likes’ to hide, and does so, as the late Pierre Hadot carefully
reminded us, as from a wholly other temperament did Jacques Lacan, in plain sight,
without veils.37 Thus, Heidegger writes:

36

Cited in GA 7, p. 54. For Heisenberg’s text, see Werner Heisenberg, ‘Die gegenwärtigen
Grundprobleme der Atomphysik,’ in Wandlungen in den Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaften
(Zurich: S. Hirzel, 1949), 89–101.
37
Pierre Hadot, ‘Isis Has No Veils,’ Common Knowledge 12, no. 3 (2006): 349–353. See further,
Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature, trans. Michael Chase
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
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Scientific representation is never able to encompass the coming to presence of nature; for
the objectness of nature is, antecedently, only one way in which nature exhibits itself.
Nature thus remains for the science of physics that which cannot be gotten around. (GA 7,
p. 56)

And that ‘which cannot be gotten around’ is where we find ourselves as we speculate on how it goes not with being but with Heidegger, on his impact prospects and
his liabilities as a research thematic in the twenty-first century in which we find
ourselves. That this is a suitable topic for research is already patent in our undertaking as a very explicit kind of intellectual Machenschaft, as Heidegger here explains
that: ‘Research has disposal over anything that is when it can either calculate it in its
future course in advance or verify a calculation about its past’ (ZW, pp. 86–7). In
this way, speculators all, we continue to seek to get a bead on the state of Heidegger
studies, the current stand of viable, respectable, worthwhile research (and the whole
point will be about sorting the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’).
And yet, as with technology, precisely here in our effort to find which ways
might be best encouraged and which might not, we find ourselves (Heidegger uses
the nicely mathematical example of atomic physics and the gigantic) defined as ‘a
continual not-ever-having-been-here-yet.’ Heidegger argues that this condition
‘originates only in a blind mania for exaggerating and excelling’ and notes that
‘what can seemingly always be calculated completely, becomes precisely through
this, incalculable’ (ZW, p. 95).
It is with the incalculable that Heidegger calls for thinking, for reflection.38
‘Reflection transports the futural human being into that “between” in which he
belongs to being and yet remains a stranger amid that which is’(ZW, p. 96)—and,
of course, as Heidegger adds:
Reflection is needed as a responding that forgets itself in the clarity of ceaseless questioning
away at the inexhaustibleness of That which is worthy of questioning—of that from out of
which in the moment properly its own, responding loses the character of a questioning and
becomes simply saying. (GA 7, p. 65)

In this fashion, we are set to thinking the ‘new’ Heidegger, in Heidegger’s wake.39
Nor will anyone be surprised to learn that we are well able to think any number of
‘new’ thoughts, like the countless swells of laughter (as Nietzsche quotes Aeschylus
at the start of his The Gay Science), to wonder as he does about the future of
philosophy (the teachers of the ‘meaning of life’), as of the future of wisdom, or the
future of laugher.
38

So we read ‘that the human being will know, i.e., carefully safeguard into is truth, that which is
incalculable, only in creative questioning an shaping out of the power of genuine reflection’ (ZW,
p. 96).
39
See David Wood, Thinking after Heidegger (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).; Gail Stenstad,
Transformations: Thinking after Heidegger (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).;
Hubert L. Dreyfus, ed. Heidegger Reexamined: Art, Poetry, and Technology, Volume 3 (New York:
Routledge, 2002). And see too John Sallis, Echoes: After Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1990). Of course, Adorno had long ago sounded a call to go beyond Heidegger
as had Carnap and the latter’s heirs have been busy doing just that.
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To say, as Heidegger says, that a thinker thinks one thought is also to say that that
same thinker has yet to come into his or her own. Thinking is a project and one has
to become what one is. As the Heidegger of Being and Time alludes to Nietzsche
and through Nietzsche to Pindar:
Only because the being of the ‘there’ receives its Constitution through understanding and
through the character of understanding as projection, only because it is what it becomes (or
alternately does not become), can it say to itself ‘Become what you are.’ (SZ, p. 145)

The imperative form of this ‘projective’ ‘potentiality-for-Being’ as Heidegger
speaks of it remains to be worked out in the form of ethics.40 From Nietzsche, we
may remember that the reason this imperative urgency remains ‘needful’ is because
we have no idea who we are and not least because, essentially because, we never
think about this, we never think about what we are. Thus, we are always and already
late-comers in coming to realize that we have for Nietzsche ‘never sought
ourselves.’41
If we like our novelty dated, we can add Lacan for an edge or take a critical line
from Adorno but most of all, because we mean to be à la mode or trendy or at least
(and this is the inauthentic anxiety of our desire not to be disincluded among the
‘they’) not to be ‘out of it,’ we can add Agamben or Sloterdijk or Žižek just to cite a
few names from the old new guard or else we can cite an array of younger/older
‘new’ theorists—i.e., your name here—be these ‘new’ theorists in France, in
Germany or Scandinavia, borrowed perhaps via the analytic default of philosophy,42
or from the new fields of media theory of one sort or another, etc., provided they
have not yet been too, too read, or too, too cited (by the wrong people), provided
they are sufficiently ‘fresh’ to be counted as the right kind of ‘new.’
Heidegger: this is why we convict him as did my own teacher, Jacques Taminiaux,
of a critically important ‘nostalgia,’43 promises little in the way of either novelty or
progress. How, again to ask his own question, can his thinking get us anywhere?
And how then is a ‘new’ Heidegger even possible?

40

See my discussion, via Heidegger, of Nietzsche’s imperative in Babette Babich, ‘Become the
One You Are: On Commandments and Praise—Among Friends,’ in Nietzsche, Culture, and
Education, ed. Thomas E. Hart (London: Ashgate, 2009), 13–38.
41
See Preface of Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals : A Polemic. By way of
Clarification and Supplement to my Last Book Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Douglas Smith
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
42
See the author’s earlier analyses of the analytic-continental divide, especially, Babette Babich,
‘On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche’s Lying Truth, Heidegger’s
Speaking Language, and Philosophy,’ in A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental
Philosophy, ed. C. G. Prado (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003), 63–103. and for a recent
discussion of this same default, see Babette Babich, La fin de la pensée? Philosophie analytique
contre philosophie continentale (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2012). For my dialogue with interviewers
Dennis Erwin and Matt Storey, see Babette Babich, ‘An Improverishment of Philosophy,’ Purlieu:
A Philosophical Journal 1, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 37–72.
43
See Jacques Taminiaux, La Nostalgie de la Grèce à l’aube de l’idéalisme allemand: Kant et les
Grecs dans l’itinéraire de Schiller, de Hölderlin et de Hegel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1967).
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And after the challenge of logical positivism posed almost from its inception if we
read Heidegger’s 1920 inaugural address ‘What is Metaphysics?’, the question of the
bootlessness of his thought is one of the oldest questions raised against his thinking.
Heidegger tells us that science is concerned with facts and for this reason wants to
know ‘nothing about nothing’ (WM, p. 106). Science is concerned ‘with what-is—
and nothing else; only what-is—and nothing more; simply and solely what-is—and
beyond that, nothing’ (WM, p. 105). For Heidegger, alluding to Carnap’s objection
in his Introduction to Metaphysics: ‘He who speaks of nothing does not know what
he is doing’ (GA 40, p. 25). Heidegger goes on detailing the argument from
Parmenides through to the injunction articulated in the spirit of logical positivism
and intellectual cleanliness, that is, vis-à-vis what logicians call a performative
contradiction:
In speaking of nothing he makes it into a something. In speaking he speaks against what he
intended. He contradicts himself. But discourse that contradicts itself offends against the
fundamental rule of discourse (logos), against ‘logic.’ To speak of nothing is illogical. He
who speaks and thinks illogically is unscientific …. Such a speaking about nothing moreover consists entirely of meaningless propositions. (GA 40, p. 25)

QED: Dr. Carnap. Demonstration points: Prof. Dr. Heidegger.
Later on, in a lecture in Bühlerhöhe in 1950, given in memory of Max Kommerell,
Heidegger returns to the same problem, invoking meaningless utterances in terms of
tautology as opposed to the incipient nihilism threatening empty pronouncements
about nothing but nothing. Writing that ‘Language itself is language,’ Heidegger
repeats: the ‘understanding that is schooled in logic, thinking of everything in terms of
calculation and hence usually overbearing, calls this proposition an empty tautology’
(GA 12, p. 10). Here, Heidegger again does his critics the service of asking their questions for them, posed in and on their own terms, ‘overbearing’ or not, contra
Heidegger’s own point, as the point would seem to need to be made: ‘Merely to say
the identical thing twice—how is that supposed to get us anywhere?’ (GA 12, p. 10).
Again and again, I reflect on Heidegger’s contra: ‘But we do not want to get anywhere. We would like only for once, to get to just where we are already’ (GA 12, p. 10).
This would of course be the point of Da-Sein. What is key is openness,
thinking.
The movement here is one that for Heidegger invites us ‘to be ready and willing
to listen’ (GA 8, p. 15).
For this, in our doing that is constantly more than what we will, is still and
always what calls for thinking.
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